
THE LAND OF PROMISE

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Dr. Elmessiri's extensive research during his tenure with the Center led to the publication in 1975 of *The Encyclopedia of Zionist Concepts and Terminology*, acknowledged to be the only work of its kind in the Arabic language. Two books in Arabic, comprising his lectures at the Nasser War Academy, the Institute of Diplomacy, and the Institute of Arab Studies, were published in 1976. The first book focuses on the Zionist "imagination"; and the second provides an outline for an economic history of Western Jewry. Dr. Elmessiri also edited *A Lover from Palestine and Other Poems* (1971), a bilingual anthology of Palestinian resistance poetry.

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THE LAND OF PROMISE

A CRITIQUE
OF POLITICAL ZIONISM

Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri

with a Foreword by John Davis
former Commissioner General, UNRWA

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To my friends
Rabbi Yosef Becher, member of Neturei Karta and a lover of Zion,
and
Marwan Kanafani, an Arab from Acre and a lover of Palestine

*And I knew that both Yahia Effendi and Mussa Alami were telling the truth.
And the facile Zionism, the verbose fuss, appeared to be more ridiculous than
ever.*

David Ben Gurion (1966)

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FOREWORD

The Land of Promise by Dr. Elmessiri warrants a careful reading by everyone who wants to understand the complex nature and far-reaching implications of Zionism and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Because the book is well written, logical, and factual, it is likely to appeal not only to scholarly readers but also to large elements of the public.

The author is uniquely qualified to make such a study. Born and reared in Egypt, he holds Masters and Ph. D. degrees from Columbia and Rutgers, respectively. He has resided for long periods in Egypt and the United States and has traveled extensively throughout the Middle East. Among his many published works, this book deserves special praise for its scholarship and objectivity in treating an extremely sensitive subject.

The reader is challenged to make a critical examination of political Zionism, rather than Judaism, as the force that has generated and sustained the Arab-Israeli conflict. In analyzing political Zionism, the author discussed aspects that are not apparent to the public or perhaps not even to policymakers in general. He delineates the antecedents of Zionism, its motivation, its power base, its claim to the land of Palestine, and the far-reaching repercussions of the creation of the State of Israel on both Jews and Arabs. A critical result of this has been the twofold transfer of people—the Jews immigrating into Israel and the native Arabs being ejected from it. This transfer of people has been brought about by political Zionist action—the Jewish influx by invitation and persuasion and the Arab exodus by coercion and expulsion. The Western countries, the United States in

particular, apparently have failed to recognize the true nature of political Zionism and have accepted the ambiguities and mythicism that blur the differences between Zionism and Judaism. This accommodation which facilitates the rationalization of, and support for, a Zionist-dominated Israel also helps conceal the mistreatment of the native Arab population.

The situation is not without hope, Dr. Elmessiri concludes, and he suggests which aspects of Zionist policy and practice could be changed or eliminated so that peace and justice could be realized. None of these changes would do violence either to the basic tenets of Judaism or to the individual human rights of the Israelis and diaspora Jews.

I recommend this book as essential reading by all persons interested in the Middle East and in the important related subjects. In view of America's growing involvement in the Middle East, Dr. Elmessiri's book is most timely.

JOHN H. DAVIS

International Consultant

*Former Commissioner General
of UNRWA*

1

JUDAISM AND ZIONISM

ZIONISM AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF

It is difficult to think of a political phenomenon that generates more controversy and elicits more violent reaction than Zionism. Many political movements and institutions have been described over the years as progressive or counterrevolutionary, nationalist, or settler-colonialist. But, unlike Zionism, very few such movements in the twentieth century have been described as being "much more than a political entity."¹ It is doubtful whether any political outlook has ever been classified as a "sacred word and concept" and as "a legitimate religious belief."² Some Zionists and Zionist sympathizers even view the establishment of a state in the land of Palestine by a 1947 United Nations resolution as being a fulfillment of biblical prophecy and an event of apocalyptic significance.

It is this aspect of the controversy surrounding Zionism that makes it necessary to begin the study of this ideology by asserting the self-evident, namely, that Zionism *is* a political movement, and is *not* a religious doctrine. Perhaps the hue and cry in the West, following the 1975 United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism, is a timely reminder of the need to emphasize once more the difference between the religious belief and the political program.

Far from being sacred, Zionism is a political ideology of complex European origins, rooted primarily in the socioeconomic realities of the Eastern European Jewish ghettos and in European society of the late nineteenth century. The movement embraced a wide variety of schools and trends (General, Socialist, Religious, Revisionist, Labor, and others). The common denominator among these schools was the conviction that, since their early history, the Jews have constituted a nation, or a people, and that this peoplehood confers on them certain timeless national rights. This people, according to the Zionist argument, has existed continuously since

the time of the destruction of the Second Temple (63 B.C.). The state of exile in which the Jews found themselves, following their dispersion by the Romans, had made foreigners of them around the globe, ever yearning to return to the land of their forefathers, or at least to have a land of their own. The proponents of Zionism believed that the Jews, without waiting for divine intervention, should achieve "autoemancipation" by taking matters into their own hands and terminating their state of perpetual alienation and deep longing. The Jews must, said the new leaders, create a Jewish state of their own or, to use the more precise phrase of Theodor Herzl, "the Jews' state (*der Judenstaat*)."³ The Jewishness of this state lay neither in its religious orientation nor in its commitment to Judaism and its values; it lay in its presumed national (ethnic) Jewish character.

Many of the founders of Zionism had little concern with Judaism, and even evinced a marked hostility toward its precepts and practices. During his visit to the Holy City, Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), the Austro-Hungarian journalist and founder of Political Zionism, consciously violated many Jewish religious practices in order to emphasize his new nonreligious outlook as distinct from a traditional religious stance.⁴ Max Nordau (1849-1923), the German writer and Zionist leader, and Herzl's close friend, was a self-avowed atheist who believed that the Torah was "inferior as literature" compared "to Homer and the European classics," and that it was "childish as philosophy and revolting as morality."⁵ He even suggested that the day would come when Herzl's *Jewish State* would be given equal status with the Bible, even by its author's religious opponents.⁶ And Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952), the Russian chemist who became the first president of Israel, took pleasure at times in "baiting the Rabbis about kosher food."⁷

The Zionist settlers in Palestine, the first to implement this new philosophy of political Zionism, were unusually careful to emphasize the nonreligious and untraditional nature of their endeavor so that there would be no misunderstanding of their philosophy. It was probably with that in mind that the pioneers dropped the name "Jew," calling themselves "Hebrews" instead. They used this more modern term in their campaigns in the 1930s and in the early 1940s, calling for a "Hebrew" rather than a "Jewish" state. The current term, "Jewish state," originally coined as a nonreligious concept, was revived in the 1940s, again with no intended religious connotation.

A typical group of Zionist *halutzim* (pioneers), deliberately irreligious, and militantly atheistic, marched in defiance of Jewish dietary laws in the early 1920s to "the Wailing Wall on the Day of Atonement munching ham sandwiches."⁸ Melford Spiro, in his scholarly study of a group of Eastern European Zionists who formed a kibbutz in Palestine (Israel), described their Zionism not as "an expression of Judaism," but rather as "an escape

from it,"⁹ for the members of this group proved more responsive to a European national nonreligious ideal and showed no pride in their religious or cultural traditions.

Most of the Zionists have seen themselves in nonreligious terms. Their ideology, patterned after nineteenth-century European nationalism, was intended to replace traditional religious beliefs. As in other nationalistic movements, especially pan-Germanism and pan-Slavism (both of which had great influence on the Zionists and the idea of pan-Jewish nationhood), religious symbols and forms that had been stripped of moral content were made to serve the nationalist cause.

Jacob Klatzkin (1882-1948), a Zionist Russian thinker, drew a distinction between the Jewish religion and what he termed "the spirit of our ethic," suggesting that the former divorced from the latter could help "crystallize" the national ethos. Religion interested him neither in its spiritual nor in its "abstract" ethical aspects, as he put it. Rather, what he valued most in his faith were the rich forms of Judaism that imply "national apartness," and which therefore can "fashion and protect a national life."¹⁰ Guided by this Zionist viewpoint, many Israeli Zionists view with alarm any decline of the Jewish religion in the diaspora because of its cohesive ethnic value. However, in Israel, so they claim, "a person may discard his religion since it is merely an external form of nationality."¹¹

Such an amoral outlook, replacing deep religious commitment while making full use of it, has always proved to be a more or less sure way for recruiting the masses. This was particularly so in the case of Zionism, in view of the fact that a large sector of the Eastern European Jewish communities was deeply religious (even in a mystical sense). The fusion of the nationalist outlook with religious fervor was achieved by turning authentic religious doctrine into a national myth.

The perceptive Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Schneersohn, was fully aware of that process. Writing at the beginning of this century, he indicated that the Zionists viewed the Torah and the commandments merely as a convenient means "to strengthen collective feeling."¹² Max Nordau, as described by his biographer Meir Ben-Horin, was enough of a realist "to give proper weight to both the rational and the irrational elements in human civilization." This shrewd realism alerted Nordau, the nonbeliever, to the fact that religion could serve the nationalist drive if it were turned into "a source of potential reconstructive energy."¹³

The transference of religious themes, terms, and concepts from the religious onto the political plane is hardly noticeable in the modern world. Total secularization of perception has absorbed the religious dimension of man's experience, reducing it to the level of the natural and material. A quasi-religious secular terminology is accepted by many Jews and gentiles alike, owing to the modern trend of using religious terms to describe histor-

ical and human phenomena. Terms such as "prophetic vision," "messianism," and the "millennium"—all denoting strictly religious concepts—are commonly used to describe ideas and attitudes that are substantially political. Zionism benefits greatly from this tendency to confuse the religious with the quasi-religious terms.

Eliezer Ben Yehuda (1858–1923), the founder of the modern renaissance of the Hebrew language, had the sense to distinguish between the religious meaning of the term "redemption" and its more mundane designation. He emphasized that "redemption" for him was the restoration of the Jewish nation to the land of its fathers, and the restoration of the Hebrew language as a national tongue. He perceived this in a "clear and literal" sense. Any talk about a spiritual people or a religious community was, for him, merely a "veiled and over-subtle substitute"¹⁴ for the real national, nonreligious sense, which the Zionists had evolved.

Intolerance of subtlety and complexity, so evident in Ben Yehuda's writings and similar works, can be traced back to the scientism of many Zionist thinkers who were contemptuous of religious modes of perception and impatient with truly religious ideas based on a nonmaterialistic point of reference. Many of the Zionist theorists and founding fathers either came from nonreligious backgrounds or held unfavorable views of Judaism and the Jews, and often of all religions for that matter. Given this outlook and state of mind, Zionists experienced genuine difficulty in trying to understand the full significance of some Jewish religious concepts, grappling in vain with some of the central tenets of Judaism. However, they were familiar with the folklore of the Eastern European Jewish ghetto and they considered Jewish religious practices and beliefs as part of this folklore. It is only in this limited "ethnic" sense that Zionism can claim to be "Jewish." The ethnicity, needless to say, is not in the least universal, for it is largely of Eastern European origin.

There are, however, some "religious" Zionists who believe that there is not only compatibility but also a necessary relationship between the political ideology and the faith. However, if a movement or a state is to be identified as Jewish or Christian, it must be judged by Jewish or Christian criteria. In order to assess the Jewishness of Religious Zionism, we should follow the same procedure. The initial Zionist theoretical formulation, it should be remembered, was avowedly nonreligious. It was evolved and implemented by atheists; only later was it sanctioned by religious apologists. Rabbi Isaac Kook (1865–1935), a Russian cabalist mystic and first Ashkenazi chief rabbi in Palestine, was one of the first religious apologists who asserted that the Zionist settlers, even though heretical and irreligious, were implementing the dictates of Judaism by physically settling in Palestine. He gave his unqualified support for Zionist settlement and issued several *responsa*, written replies to questions about Jewish law, in order to

bestow religious legitimacy upon the Zionist project, probably in the vain hope of eventually converting the future Zionist state into a full-fledged theocracy.

It is true that a quasi-religious orthodoxy is quite influential in the Zionist state, especially in matters pertaining to the laws governing personal affairs, such as marriage, divorce, and death, but not those governing national or foreign policies. It is, however, an orthodoxy devoid of any universal moral content, and it never betrays any signs of religious transcendence. A clear manifestation of this "orthodoxy" is the system of "files and informers" set up to ascertain the "Jewishness" of an individual or his lack of it, in order to determine his eligibility for marriage. This process has produced a unique "blacklist of unmarriedable Israelis."¹⁵ The concern here is more with racial purity and religious segregation than with moral and religious values.

But this religious orthodoxy also dabbles in politics—foreign and domestic—as is evident in the case of the Gush Emunim, the small annexationist group whose emotionalism does not demonstrate any piety or charity. It is difficult for a detached observer to recognize anything Jewish, in a religious sense, in the activities of this group. It is even more difficult to detect anything ennobling in the words of Rabbi Moshe Ben-Zion Uspizai of Ramat-Gan. His Religious Zionist interpretation of the Talmud has led him to call for the destruction of the Palestinians and the colonization of all the biblical Land of Israel.¹⁶ Many would agree that it is almost impossible to detect anything "religious" or "Jewish" in the words of Rabbi Abraham Avidan (Zamel), Chaplain of the Israeli Central Command, when he counseled mistrust of the Arabs because, as he claimed, "we should not, according to religious law, trust a gentile." When he told the Israeli soldiers that "they are allowed—and they are obliged, according to the law—to kill . . . good civilians, or rather civilians who appear to be good," and when he quoted the saying, "The best of the gentiles you should kill,"¹⁷ we know he was not speaking in the name of any religious or ethical code, but was merely repeating words out of context in order to rationalize acts of brutality.

It is quite evident that the ideology and practice of this Religious Zionism is nationalistic, in the narrowest sense, and that its literalist interpretations and exegeses are as incompatible with Judaism as those of the nonreligious Zionists. Mahatma Gandhi, India's great philosopher and leader, arrived at the same conclusion in 1938. Commenting on Zionist settlement in Palestine and the violence that accompanied it, he declared that "a religious act cannot be performed with the aid of the bayonet or the bomb."¹⁸

Moshe Menuhin, in his *Jewish Critics of Zionism*,¹⁹ pointed out that the Jewish prophets always warned against the rabid nationalists who try

to build "up Zion with blood and Jerusalem with iniquity." Therefore, it comes as no surprise to learn that the Neturei Karta (guardians of the city), the Jewish orthodox sect, characterizes the Zionist rabbis as "the clericals of the false Israel," who "teach a false doctrine." According to them, true Israel is based on a commitment to God and Torah,²⁰ going beyond the established order (or disorder) of nature and history. This Religious Zionism, therefore, is better understood if we view it not as a serious religious commitment or as a willingness to shoulder the moral burdens attendant on religious belief, but rather as a nationalism defended with religious zeal. It is largely a variety of political Zionism assuming a religious form.

If one were to take the literalist and nationalist interpretations of the Torah and the Talmud as the "right" ones, and assume that a reading of these religious texts demonstrates, for instance, that the Jews of Russia, Rumania, Berlin, and Brooklyn have the right to emigrate and settle in Palestine, then one would argue (as does Dr. Mohamed Mehdi, Secretary General of the American-Arab Relations Committee) that this aspect of the Jewish faith (which the Jewish religionists themselves deny) "should be condemned."²¹ One can also add that if Christianity encourages the occupation of the Holy Land, as it did in the Middle Ages, or if the call is sounded for the "return" of Arab "exiles" to Andalusia (as southern Spain was called during Arab rule), then those aspects of Christianity and Islam should be viewed as equally aggressive. But, in fact, these literalist interpretations used to justify military aggression and territorial expansion have very little to do with authentic religious doctrine.

A PHYSICAL AND SPIRITUAL ZION

One can detect the falseness of Religious Zionist apologetics by comparing them with genuine religious doctrine. The cardinal trait of religious conviction, in contrast with other human ideologies or creeds, is the concept of transcendence, based not on emotional experience but rather on a firm belief in something beyond nature and matter. Love of Zion is an excellent example of a Jewish religious concept suffused with this sense of transcendence; it sets the land of Palestine, or *Eretz Yisrael*, apart from the rest of the world as a holy land, God's own. Consequently, the concrete history of the peoples actually living there is rightly and legitimately overlooked. Zion is thus an ideal, and the believer is urged to develop a pious attachment to it. Such belief imbues him with the spiritual strength, particularly in this age of increasing materialism and positivism, to transcend his surroundings and to establish a link with the ideal. Dwelling in the land was indeed considered a *mitzva*, a good deed in the religious sense. Throughout history many religious Jews have gone to dwell in the Holy

Land. Viewed in this light, love of Zion is not radically different from the attachment that the followers of many religions have for their respective "holy places"—their "Zions," so to speak.

Many religious Jewish thinkers believe that to dwell in Zion (the Land and/or the City) is a religious duty; yet, to them, their understanding of this concept of their faith is in direct contradiction with the political Zionist interpretation of it. Nathan Birnbaum (1864-1937), the Austro-Hungarian Jewish writer, wrote that for religious Jews *Eretz Yisrael* is not a new country, but an entity they have never ceased to love, to yearn for, and to remember. The religious, with their keen desire to fulfill the *mitzva*, wanted to dwell in Palestine "for the sanctification of the land."²² These sentiments, as expressed by Birnbaum, are unmistakably and deeply religious. Followers of any religion who are able to transcend some of the limits of their own dogma can comprehend Birnbaum's feelings and relate them to their own. Birnbaum, however, contrasts the dwelling "for the sanctification of the land" to the dwelling, or rather settlement, that results in "its desecration."²³ The first takes place within a commitment to religious values and beliefs, the second is nationalistic and political, and therefore has a completely different content and goal.

It is of some interest to note that Gandhi, expressing his opposition to Zionism, used words remarkably similar to Birnbaum's: "The Palestine of the Biblical conception is not a geographical tract. It is in [the Jews'] hearts."²⁴ The same distinction was made recently by Nancy Fuchs-Kreimer, a rabbinical student and member of the Board of Directors of Breira, who faults an American Zionist on his use of "the word 'Israel' in two different ways"—to refer "to the dream of Zion restored—a Zion which would represent all the highest values of the Jews," and to identify "the nation-state Israel, population: 3 million; Prime Minister: Yitzhak Rabin."²⁵

Such a subtle distinction between the physical reality and the religious concept is not in keeping with the tenets of political Zionism and the Zionist outlook. Nordau, for instance, was somewhat bewildered when he discovered that the rabbis were opposed to the Zionist call for a "physical" return to Zion. "After all," he protested, "it should be their principal function to keep alive the love of the Jews for their people and for *Eretz Yisrael*."²⁶ The Zionist fundamentalist could not comprehend the fact that the rabbis were indeed urging the Jews to love Zion in the full religious sense, for when they thought of *Eretz Yisrael*, the pious had enough clarity of vision to see it as a religious concept rather than a geographical reality.

The absence of genuine religious "love of Zion" on the part of the Zionists was noted in 1903 by Rabbi Schneersohn.²⁷ Even Nordau himself, when not posturing as a nationalist mystic, was forthright enough to recognize his convictions for what they were. For instance, addressing the

Fourth Zionist Congress (1900), he declared that in developing their ideology, the Zionists were not motivated by any "mystical yearning for Zion." "Of that," he assured everybody, "most of us are free."²⁸

To Herzl, similarly, the vision that the Promised Land offered was not one of salvation and redemption, but of opportunities for settlement and investment. That is why he believed that "the location" was to be determined in a positivist way as a "purely scientific" issue. "We must have regard," he wrote, "for geological, climatic, in short, natural factors of all kinds with full circumspection and with consideration of the latest research."²⁹ The whole question of the territory of the Zionist state was deliberately left open, for Herzl was neither against Palestine nor for Argentina. He wrote in his *Diaries* that his interest was focused on a territory that had "a varied climate for the Jews who are used to colder or to warmer regions." Other economic considerations were equally important. Anticipating a bright future in world trade for his proposed state, he wrote that "we have to be located on the sea, and for our large-scale mechanized agriculture we must have wide areas at our disposal." As a nonreligious Jew, his approach to his own proposal was correctly materialistic, for he advised the Zionists to turn to "the scientists . . . to provide us with information."³⁰

Leo Pinsker (1821-1891), a Russian Zionist thinker whose writings predate Herzl's, was not overly concerned with the actual location of the territory selected for Jewish settlement. He believed it could take place in any of "the two hemispheres. . . . This piece of land might form a small territory in North America, or a sovereign pashalik in Asiatic Turkey."³¹ Pinsker even suggested that the Jews must not attach themselves to Palestine and should "not dream of restoring ancient Judea." The goal, as he defined it, "must not be the 'Holy Land,' but a land of our own."³² Like Herzl, Pinsker had harbored diverse pragmatic notions. The land finally chosen had to be "productive and well-located." Its area was to be such as "to allow the settlement of several millions." The selection, Pinsker insisted, should not be based on "offhand decisions"; a "commission of experts" was to weigh and evaluate the options.³³

Even when Palestine was considered as an alternative, Herzl was at great pains to emphasize the nonreligious nature of the choice. He told Pope Pius X, on January 26, 1904, that the Zionists were "not asking for Jerusalem" or such holy places; it was "only the secular land" which interested him.³⁴ He was even more emphatic when he assured Cardinal Merry del Val that he was not looking for *Eretz Yisrael*, but that he was "asking only for the profane earth."³⁵

The East Africa (Uganda) project of which Herzl and Nordau approved and which the Sixth Zionist Congress (1903) did *not* reject, is a good case in point. The Congress voted, 295 to 17, to appoint a committee

of inquiry "to investigate possibilities of Jewish settlement there." When some of the delegates withdrew in protest, another vote was taken which still yielded a majority in favor of the proposal.³⁶ The delegates representing the Zionist settlers in Palestine (Ben Yehuda among them) were among the supporters of the Uganda scheme. In the Seventh Zionist Congress (1905), the Uganda scheme was rejected by the delegates "after the commission of inquiry sent by the Sixth Congress to examine the proposed territory presented a negative report in their findings." The settlement plan was also opposed both by British settlers in East Africa and assimilated Jews in Britain.³⁷

The whole nonreligious trend represented by these early Zionist leaders could be termed "Zionism without Zion"—"Zion" being a place clearly interchangeable with any other. As a matter of fact, the interchangeability of the territory of the Zionist state is the main premise of the Territorialist Zionism of Israel Zangwill (1864-1926), the British Zionist novelist.

Notwithstanding these historical facts, religious symbols and imagery were often prudently adopted in the drive to recruit religious Jews and to endow a political ideology with sanctity. Among the more revealing alternatives considered as possible for Jewish settlement was Iraq. One of the proponents of this settlement scheme believed that in calling upon the Jews to settle in Iraq, the Zionist movement could "make use of the mystic elements"³⁸ associated with the Jewish experience in that ancient land. Probably that factor, together with equally cynical ones, such as support for an "English policy in the Orient,"³⁹ led the Zionists to opt for Palestine, also known in Zionist literature as Zion and later as Israel. In favor of Palestine, as Herzl indicated, was "the mighty legend—the very name."⁴⁰ It would be, the playwright said, "a marvelously effective rallying cry."⁴¹

The confusion between Zion of the heart and Palestine has created problems of a tragic nature for the Palestinians. Paradoxically, the Zionists themselves have had to deal with some unpleasant problems. For instance, if Palestine is Zion, then some of the biblical injunctions concerning the soil of the Holy Land should be applied to it. One such injunction enjoins the Jews to let the land lie "fallow on the seventh year." Interpreted literally, this would, of course, spell economic disaster. However, a "dispensation on technical grounds,"⁴² issued by Rabbi Kook, provides that *Eretz Yisrael* be sold every six years to a gentile at a nominal price.⁴³ Thus, Zionist settlers can continue to work the land, which has ostensibly fallen once more into gentile hands, without any pangs of conscience. Once the seventh year is over, the land is duly bought back. This ceremony still takes place in Israel, without much publicity.

THE MESSIAH WITH A FLAG

Love of Zion is linked to a concept probably unique to Judaism, though not without analogues in some Christian (Protestant) and Islamic (Shiite) eschatological doctrines; that is, the concept of the messianic restoration of Zion and the messianic return. This concept clearly implies a form of "religious Zionism," which, according to Rabbi Elmer Berger, a leading American anti-Zionist scholar, "many Jews do profess, as do many Christians." Rabbi Berger, who does not himself share this belief, states that "this Zionism holds that, in *God's own time* and in *His own way*, when man is ready for the millenium, Jews will be returned to Palestine and Zion shall shine forth again as the place from where all mankind shall hear the word of the Lord."⁴⁴

The messianic message in Judaism generates a creative tension in the life of the believer, for he can live in this world without being entirely absorbed in it. He is constantly expecting the arrival of the Messiah, who will dispense absolute justice and spread harmony among all the peoples. At the moment of discord, there is always the hope of harmony; in the midst of chaos, there is the expectation of order. In the here-and-now is implied another time and another place.

Although such a belief includes a definite concept of the "ingathering of the exiles," the emphasis is undoubtedly on the divine agency of the return. The restoration of Zion is not to be achieved through the medium of individuals or groups who would preempt the divine will, and would themselves decide that history ends here and now and that the present moment is the long awaited messianic epoch. The Talmud, in some passages, even considers anyone "returning" to Palestine as positively breaking a biblical commandment.⁴⁵ That much was expressed in a letter sent to Herzl by a Jewish editor, whose purpose was to remind Herzl that Talmudic teachings "forbade the Jews from taking Palestine by force or establishing a state there."⁴⁶ Discussing "Jewish nationalism" in an American publication, Rabbi Philip Sigal touched on the question of the "ingathering of the exiles," declaring that "there is no article of faith among all medieval attempts to formulate a Jewish creed which includes as one dogma or principle, immigration to Israel."⁴⁷

Theodor Herzl clearly disavowed any link or sympathy with the messianic concept. When asked by King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy whether he expected the coming of the Messiah, the Zionist leader, with obvious embarrassment, assured the king that in religious circles they still did, but "in our own, the academically trained, and enlightened circles, no such thought exists, of course."⁴⁸

But, since the messianic idea is central to Judaism, the Zionists, like the false messiahs, tried to exploit it for their own ends. One cardinal trait

of the fraudulent messianic movements in Judaism, as Rabbi Jacob Bernard Agus indicated in *The Meaning of Jewish History*, is impatience with the divine will and emphasis on man's initiative.⁴⁹ Zionism, with its emphasis on autoemancipations, proved to be no exception to the pattern. Ambassador Chaim Herzog, Israel's representative to the United Nations, declared, in describing the rise of Zionism, that "the Jewish people organized the Zionist movement in order to transform a dream into reality."⁵⁰ This pseudo-messianic impatience is manifest in the thoughts and writings of Ben Gurion, who characterized the concept of the coming of the Messiah as too "passive" from his Zionist standpoint.⁵¹

Another trait of false messianism is its absolute certainty concerning "the identity of the Redeemer," for it conceives this divine personality as a "concrete person, a specific plan or organization. It is here and now, certain and irresistible."⁵² In Zionist literature, the traditional Messiah of Jewish religious lore practically disappears, to be replaced by a series of literal surrogates. At times, he becomes an impulse that expresses itself through the Jewish people; at others, he becomes "a messianic epoch," which starts on May 1948, or the First Zionist Congress, or at this or that point *in* time. Ben Gurion identified Jewish messianism with "the messianic longings of the Jewish people for national redemption in the land of their fathers."⁵³ Herzl even flirted with the idea that the Messiah could be the "electric current."⁵⁴ An Israeli secularist has shrewdly observed that "the Messiah, who is supposed to appear and redeem his people at the Millennium, when the dead will rise from the grave and the Almighty will sit in judgment on the world, has been identified by some with the personalities of leaders of the State."⁵⁵

Reminiscing at a banquet in 1927, Weizmann said that when he held the Balfour Declaration in his hands, he thought for a fleeting second that he had heard the steps of the Messiah. But knowing better, he checked himself and recalled the quietism of the religious tradition: "The true Redeemer is said to come silently like a thief in the night."⁵⁶ Having realized that the Balfour Declaration was not exactly a form of divine mediation, Weizmann stated on another occasion that the twentieth-century return to Zion "would not take place without the assistance of a Great Power."⁵⁷

Herzl, despite his protestations to the Italian king, experienced some messianic illusions about himself and his role. But he had the good sense not to pose as the true Redeemer, identifying himself instead with the fraudulent messiah Shabbetai Tzvi, drawing comparisons between himself and his seventeenth-century predecessor. He even contemplated composing an opera about him, to be performed in the Zionist state.⁵⁸

Herzl's messiah would return not to Zion but to any territory. He would not take with him the Jewish people as a religious community but

only "those Jews who are unable to assimilate."⁵⁹ Nor would he take the rich West side Jews of Berlin, but the Jews of North or East Berlin, the poor ones.⁶⁰ In other words, those "returning" would do so for various true or imaginary socioeconomic reasons, which had little to do with Judaism. The Zionist "messiah" was so aware of the power of political motivation that he believed that "with a flag one can lead men wherever one wishes, even into the Promised Land."⁶¹

The "messiah with a flag" was deeply influenced by the pan-Germanic nationalist thought of his time and its pervasive pantheism. Perhaps it is the Germanic origins of Zionist thinking which account for the centrality of the idea of the state in the Zionist scheme and for the Zionist postulation of the state as a categorical imperative for the fulfillment of Judaism and Jewishness. This idea is, of course, quite distinct from the millennial rule of the Messiah. Any reader of Herzl's diaries will perceive how Germanic adulation of the state, as an abstraction, has been made to replace Jewish commitment to moral values. "The foundation of a State lies in the will of the people for a state, yes, even in the will of one sufficiently powerful individual. . . . Territory is only the material basis; the State itself, when it possesses a territory, is always something abstract."⁶²

Herzl was a devoted admirer of this Germanic abstraction. "Look at the plan called 'The Unification of Germany,'" he wrote in his diary on August 22, 1895. It was created "out of ribbons, flags, songs, speeches, and finally, singular struggles." Pursuing this theme, the father of Zionism admonished his readers not to "underestimate Bismarck! . . . he forced [the Germans] to wage wars"—one war after another. Writing admiringly of the beneficial effects of these wars on Germany, he declared: "A nation drowsy in peacetime jubilantly hailed unification in wartime."⁶³

Waiting one day for one of his many colonial sponsors, Herzl saw from his window several groups of German officers marching in the Flag Festival. "And up the street came cadets," he wrote in his diary, "littler and littler ones, the future officers of this inexhaustible Germany, which wants to take us under its protection."⁶⁴ He had been entertaining the thought that the return could be effected, not through divine mediation, but "under the protection of this strong, great, moral, splendidly governed, tightly organized Germany," which is certain to "have the most salutary effect on the Jewish national character."⁶⁵ This surely has very little to do with Judaism or any religion.

In more recent times, General Ariel Sharon asserted in *Marriv* of January 25, 1974, that "the first and the most supreme value is the good of the State. The State is the supreme value."⁶⁶ We are once more reminded, not of Jewish religious traditions, but rather of the great tragedy that this kind of state adulation brought upon humanity not long ago in Europe.

A METAPHYSIC OF PEOPLEHOOD

What has been said of the misuse of the terms "love of Zion," "the return" or "the Messiah" applies equally to the concept of "Jewish peoplehood." Jewish religious tradition has a rich vocabulary referring to the Jewish people variously as the Chosen People, the Holy People, the Spiritual People, Israel (he who strives with the Lord) and God's treasure. Like Israel (the land), Israel (the people) is set apart from the rest of mankind as a community having a special relationship with a transcendent God, a claim made by all the devout in almost all religions.

But this sense of chosen-ness is defined and limited by other concepts and images in Judaism. The majestic story of the creation of Adam and Eve implies a common origin for all people and therefore a basic equality between them. God in Judaism is universal, the God of all who blesses all nations and who considers the Jews "as the Children of Ethiopians unto me."⁶⁷ Therefore, the vision of salvation includes all nations. When Isaiah prophesies about peace, he conjures up an image of universal peace for *all* nations:

Nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
Neither shall they learn war any more. (Isaiah 2:4)

Peace will envelop all, for all peoples are His children. "Blessed be Egypt my people, and Assyria the work of my hands, and Israel mine heritage" (Isaiah 19:25).

Regardless of one's interpretation of the idea of chosen-ness, one thing should be remembered—the term "Jewish people" in Judaism is a religious one, signifying a community of true believers who put their faith in One True God, and whose membership in that community, as British historian Arnold Toynbee wrote, is conditional on their obeying God's commands.⁶⁸ The traditional peoplehood is a community of believers, whose faith is based on a religious covenant between God and His people. This peoplehood is still being so defined. Emile L. Fackenheim, a contemporary Jewish theologian, believes that if the Jew wants to survive as a Jew, he must accept "as authentic the ancient encounter of his people with the living God." This people is "constituted by an encounter with the Nameless and [is] still extant as a people only because it continues to be committed to that encounter."⁶⁹

Given the fact that the Jews are the people of the Torah and not the people of a certain land or soil, political or national allegiance is of little importance. The Jew is counseled by his sages and prophets to make his peace with the earthly city like any other citizen. Over 2,500 years ago the prophet Jeremiah said, "Seek ye the welfare of the city . . . and pray in its

behalf unto the Lord; for in its welfare shall ye fare well."⁷⁰ This same theme is detected in the words of Robert Loeb in the "Breira Report," in which he discusses unity among the Jewish communities "through spiritual, moral, cultural, historical and 'peoplehood' ties *outside the political framework*."⁷¹

But such a spiritual outlook was not popular with Zionist leaders and thinkers who took a different view of the matter. For instance, Micah Berdichevsky (1865-1922), the Russian Zionist writer, declared emphatically that the Jews should "cease to be Jews by virtue of an abstract Judaism and become Jews in their own right, as a living and developing nationality."⁷² Arthur Hertzberg, in his anthology *The Zionist Idea*, refers to Eliezer Ben Yehuda as reiterating the Zionist "messianic theme" that the "Jews must end their peculiar history [as a religious community] by becoming a modern secular nation."⁷³

Repeating the same Zionist theme, Max Nordau declared that "we do not want to be a mere religious community; we want to be a nation like all other nations."⁷⁴ Having been told that "the Jews are different from the other inhabitants of their native lands only by virtue of their religion and definitely not by virtue of their nationality," Nordau replied that it would be the business of Zionism to "turn the Jews into a distinct people in the national sense of the term."⁷⁵ Jacob Klatzkin believed in a nationhood based on land and language, and therefore any talk of "spiritual uniqueness" was for him "a mark of the diseased abnormality of an un-nation."⁷⁶ In keeping with the nationalist definition, a Zionist periodical once claimed "that even one who transgressed all the commandments of the Torah, even one who denied the existence of God, was a Jew provided that he was a nationalist."⁷⁷

The pattern of appropriating a religious idiom to describe a secular phenomenon is again very much in evidence here. The sanctity attached to the Jewish people in the religious sense is transferred to the Jewish people in the ethnic sense and, accordingly, to the people's history, to their land, and finally, to their state. This is achieved through a relative de-emphasis of the transcendence of the God of Israel and through a concurrent emphasis on the sanctity of Israel, the nation, until God and the people become more or less identical.

In Zionist literature, the pantheistic interchangeability between the sacred and timeless, on the one hand, and the profane and temporal on the other is such that the effort to define the boundaries between these two distinct categories is almost futile. In seeking the source or the basis of sacredness in Zionist writings, one finds it virtually impossible to determine whether it is the Lord or the *Volk*, for the dialogue between the two is so intimate and casual that it turns out, under close scrutiny, to be a monologue. A French anti-Zionist aptly described the Zionists as "*adornateurs de*

leur sang"⁷⁸ (worshippers of their own blood), something coiled around itself in rapt self-satisfaction.

The theology of Martin Buber (1878–1965), the mystic Zionist thinker, manifests a similar transference of sacredness, which inevitably leads to confusion. Buber used the term "Israel" in both a national and a religious sense, Israel being a "people like no other . . . both a nation and a religious community." This unique religio-national people experiences "history and revelation as one phenomenon, history as revelation and revelation as history . . . here humanity is touched by the divine."⁷⁹

While Rabbi Kook's writings are not as subtle or complex as Buber's, he and other religious Zionists dwell in their own fashion on this theme. Rabbi Kook asserted that the Jewish people are "different from all nations, set apart by a historical experience that is unique and unparalleled,"⁸⁰ the reason being, according to him, that "the spirit of Israel is so closely linked to the spirit of God." But the especially "close link" is transmuted a few lines later by a radical form of pantheism, for all national possessions of the Jewish people—land, language, history, and even customs—are said to be "vessels of the spirit of the Lord."⁸¹ In such a context, Rabbi Kook described nationalism or religion "as merely elements of the spirit of Israel," an implied identity between the nationalist ideology of the people and divine dictates. Such an interpretation led him to adopt the deterministic position that "a Jewish nationalist, no matter how secularist his intention may be, must, despite himself, affirm the divine."⁸²

Even a supposedly level-headed pragmatist such as Horace Mayer Kallen, the American Zionist educational thinker, accepts this mystical view of Israel. He believes that the memories, hopes, and fears, the creeds and codes, and the works and ways of the Israelis invest their national struggles with sacredness. The mysticism transvalues "the brute stuffs" of their daily lives, "even as the Christian doctrine of the Real Presence transforms the vapid stale wafer of his Holy Communion for the true believer."⁸³

The sanctity or divinity of the Jewish people, or its "naturalistic supernaturalism," if we may borrow one of Kallen's terms,⁸⁴ is the common ground on which nonreligious and Religious Zionists meet. It forms the basis for a facile adoption of a religious language that both can use. Both groups can think in terms of a holy people (and a holy land), but whereas the religious see the source of this holiness as divine, for the non-religious it is self-begotten. This religio-national pantheism made it possible for Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880–1940), the Russian Zionist leader, to speak of himself as "one of the masons building a new temple for my God—whose name is Jewish people."⁸⁵ It is also equally legitimate for Reform Rabbi Eugene B. Borowitz to claim that what was on trial in the Arab-Israeli war on June 5, 1967, was "in very earnest God Himself," and

therefore any question concerning the outcome of the war "was not military . . . it was theological."⁸⁶ Given this transvalued divinity and sanctity, it became perfectly natural for General Moshe Dayan to refer to the *eretz* as his only God. He could also ask for the military occupation of the Land of the Torah, and then receive a cable from Rabbi Isaac Nissim, Israel's Sephardic chief rabbi, congratulating him on his correct interpretation of the Torah.

Possibly such thinking lies behind the decision to replace the traditional phrase "God of Israel" by the vague term "tsur Israel" (the rock of Israel) in the Israeli Declaration of Independence. It is a vague term, traditional enough to satisfy the orthodox and godless enough to satisfy the atheist.

If history is revelation and revelation is history, as Buber claimed, then it is possible to agree with Yigal Yadin, Israel's scholarly retired general and active politician, that for young Israelis a "belief in history" has come to be a substitute for religious faith. Thus, the young consider their religious values not through a creative rediscovery of their Holy Book or religious tradition and values, but through the science of archaeology. Through this science and in a respectable positivistic way, they "learn that their forefathers were in this country 3,000 years ago. This is a value."⁸⁷ But they will undoubtedly learn these national values as if they were religious absolutes, for these Israeli youngsters learn their history from their Holy Book. The Torah for them, as it was for the early Zionists, is "a historical record testifying to [the Jews'] ancient nationhood."⁸⁸ An Israeli writer, Boaz Evron, commenting on this situation said, "If you substitute nationalism for religion, *raison d'état* becomes the sole absolute value."⁸⁹

Buttressed by their belief that their earthly nationhood stems from "divine" origins or that it has certain innate holiness, the Zionist Israelis see their acts not only as legitimate but also as invested with sanctity. Israel can thus be described as a godless theocracy. It is godless insofar as it is based on a metaphysic of the national self and on rights that may not be questioned; godless insofar as the collective conscience of its leadership is undisturbed by any of the traditional ethical values that ordinarily follow from a belief in the Almighty.

The Zionist attempt at replacing Judaism or recasting it in national ethnic terms did not go unchallenged by religious or humanist Jewish thinkers. In an astute characterization of the new national religion, Rabbi Judah Magnes (1877-1948), a Religious Zionist who turned into a critic of the movement and who opposed the creation of the Zionist state, wrote of the "new Jewish voice" that "speaks from the mouth of guns." That is the "new Torah," he lamented, coming from the land of Israel. But it is not the true Torah of Judaism, he argued, for it tries to shackle Judaism and

the people of Israel to "the madness of physical force." He even described this new religion as "pagan Judaism."⁹⁰

Israel Shahak, an Israeli dissenter who is a professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, argued that Jewish idealization of the state of Israel is "both immoral and against the mainstream of Jewish tradition and must bring disaster to Israel." In words that almost echo those of Magnes, he declared that "it seems to me that the majority of my people has left God, and has substituted an idol in His place," exactly as when "they were so devoted to the Golden Calf in the desert. . . . The name of this modern idol is the State of Israel."⁹¹

Zionism was regarded by many Eastern European religious Jews as the latest and least reputable "catastrophic pseudo-messianic" heresy, for it confuses superficially similar elements: one from the physical world (the natural cult of people, language, and soil), and the other from the world of religious transcendence (the Holy Land and the fulfillment of the divine precepts connected with the soil).⁹² To these religious Jews, the false parallelism between the indigenous traditional Jewish precepts and the imported nonreligious concepts made Zionism "the most confusing and therefore the most dangerous of all the Satanic ordeals that the Community had ever to face."⁹³ Even though superficially similar to Judaism, according to some Jewish critics of the movement, Zionism represents "*the direct opposite* of all that constitutes"⁹⁴ authentic religious belief.

The debate between Zionist, non-Zionist, and anti-Zionist Jews concerning the religious legitimacy of Zionism is still raging, assuming at times violent forms, as in the case of Rabbi Jacob De Haan, who is believed to have been felled by Zionist bullets on June 30, 1924.⁹⁵ The Arabs, regardless of whether they are Muslims or Christians, find themselves involved in this controversy. The transposition of religious concepts from the religious plane to the political plane has led to two demographic changes, as historical events clearly demonstrated: transferring Jews from the diaspora to Israel; and expelling the Palestinians from Palestine to their own present diaspora. Consequently, what might appear as a strictly theological discussion has a direct bearing on the destiny of the Arabs. They understandably lend their support to those who are interested in keeping spiritual precepts and political concepts apart and distinct.

8

ISRAELI-ZIONIST RACISM

IN CAPTIVITY: THE LAWS OF RETURN AND NATIONALITY

The national ancestral dream was fulfilled, and the two population transfers of the vast majority of Palestine Arabs and of a small minority of diaspora Jews were achieved. Yet these developments did not usher in the beginning of the thousand years of lasting peace and justice. The cleansing of the land was not complete, for a Palestinian remnant was left behind in Zion, casting the Zionist state in the role of the oppressor.

Israel, founded as a state for the Jews and determined to maintain and perpetuate this Jewish identity, has incorporated discriminatory laws into its very legal framework. Israeli-Zionist discrimination as such is not merely a matter of personal bigotry or *de facto* segregation; it is primarily a matter of *de jure* discrimination. This particular trait is what sets the racial discrimination practiced by settler-colonial enclaves apart from racial discrimination in the rest of the world. One of the most discriminatory Israeli laws is the Law of Return. Promulgated on July 5, 1950, it grants automatic citizenship to any Jew upon his arrival in Israel, even though he may never before have set foot in the Middle East. This same right is denied to a Palestinian Arab born and raised in Palestine who wishes to return to his homeland. The law has no parallel in any other country; it is based on the unique Zionist concept of pan-Jewish peoplehood and can be construed as racist in that it denies non-Jews their inalienable rights in their own homeland.

Unlike any other country in the world, with the exception of racially conscious settler states, immigrants to Israel are recruited not on the basis of the skills they may have, and which the Zionist state may need, but on the basis of a unique quality—Jewishness, which is defined as a religious,

ethnic, and/or genetic quality. In order to maintain the desired demographic balance, the *olim*—that is, Jews returning to their Fatherland according to the Law of Return—are granted all kinds of economic privileges that are denied to the native Arabs.

During the debate before the Law of Return was approved, an Israeli professor, M. R. Konvitz, expressed fears that such a law might be unfavorably compared with Nazi laws, since it embodies "a principle of exclusion which constitutes religious discrimination." He argued that though the law might offer temporary advantages at a time when large numbers of displaced persons in camps had to be settled, thereafter it would undoubtedly be considered discriminatory.¹ Following its passage, the *Jewish Newsletter* warned in its May 12, 1952, issue that the law "revives a dangerous racist theory that smacks of the slogan of a previous generation. A German is a German wherever he is." Reuven Grass, a religious emigrant from the United States to Israel, compared the amended Law of Return to the Nazi laws as "it gives immigration privileges to anyone who is Jewish under the Nuremberg Laws' definition, i.e., having a Jewish grandparent."² In fact, there is at least one recorded case wherein the "religious" authorities in Israel used Nazi records to establish the religio-ethnic racial identity of an Israeli citizen.

The uniquely racist character of the Law of Return can be detected in the rigid and hierarchical terms employed in Israel to distinguish between the various forms of immigration. If a Jew returns to *Eretz Yisrael*, this form of immigration is an *aliyah*, or ascent—something akin to a religious experience, "a fulfillment of an ideal . . . the elevation of one's personality to a higher ethical level," as indicated in the entry on *aliyah* in the *Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel*.³ However, if he emigrates from the Holy Land, this is a degeneration, for he would then be committing *yeridah*, or descent—an apostasy that denotes a fall from paradise into mere history.

If a Soviet emigrant changes his mind during his *aliyah* to the *eretz* (as many have done), it is a *neshirah*, a cutting of the ascent, or a falling away, which is not so bad as *yeridah* because the Jew had not yet touched the Holy Land. A Soviet Jew, however, may leave Russia with the express purpose of emigrating to the United States. This is a *hegira*, a mere emigration, and no different from any other. When a gentile decides to emigrate to Israel, his is not a noble ascent; it is a mere *le-hesh-takia*; that is, a settlement with no religious aura surrounding it.

Palestinian Arabs who stayed on in that part of Palestine that became Israel had to apply for citizenship under the Nationality Law of 1952. They were considered eligible only after a variety of conditions had been met. An Arab had to prove "he was born in the country; that he lived in Israeli-occupied territory three out of the five years preceding the date of application for citizenship; that he is entitled to permanent residence; that he is

settled or intends to settle permanently in the country; that he has a sufficient knowledge of the Hebrew language."⁴

If the Arab met all of these stringent conditions, the matter was still left to "the discretion of the Israeli Minister of Interior to grant or refuse the application."⁵ The obvious motive behind these conditions is to prevent as many Palestinians as possible from acquiring Israeli nationality. An estimated 60,000 to 70,000 Arabs born in Israel and now living there are denied full rights of citizenship⁶ because, for one reason or another, they cannot fully meet the provisions of the Nationality Law for non-Jews. The number of these Arabs is increasing, "since statelessness is inherited." Some Arabs, born to parents without citizenship, become aware of their statelessness only when they apply for passports or other documents. Not all of them know that they "do not acquire Israeli citizenship by virtue of the fact that they were born in Israel—in villages where their families may have lived for generations."⁷ Palestinian Arabs and their children are allowed to claim the status of "permanent residents." This permits them to travel outside Israel only for the strictly limited period of a year and a day. Overstaying by even another 24 hours forecloses their right to reenter Israel.⁸

Being a non-Jew in the Zionist state means that one is excluded by law and by practice from enjoying certain privileges. Housing is an area where the Arabs know what it means to be a non-Jew in the Zionist state. When Arabs move into a Jewish area, many residents move away in protest. The inhabitants of Upper Nazareth have threatened "a mass exodus from the town to neighboring areas—if nothing is done to prevent the influx of Arab families to that part of the town," the July 20, 1975, issue of *Maariv* reported, adding that the protestors were willing to use force to prevent "the transformation of Upper Nazareth into an Arab town." Like most oppressed minorities, Arabs may be prepared to pay far higher rents than those offered by Jewish buyers or tenants, yet they cannot rent or buy apartments in certain areas. This deep fear of the imminent Arabization of Upper Nazareth was caused by the presence in the town of 400 Arab families.⁹

It might be of some interest to note in this context the findings of an Israeli sociologist, who reported in the *American Journal of Sociology* of May 1971 that 91 percent of the Jewish Israelis he questioned agreed that "it would be better if there were fewer Arabs" in Israel. Furthermore, 76 percent believed that the Arabs would never reach the level of progress of Jews, 86 percent would not rent a room to an Arab, and 67 percent did not wish to have an Arab as a neighbor.¹⁰

As in other areas, discrimination in housing is not so much a matter of personal bigotry. Rather, it is a policy generated and reinforced by the very structure of society and government. Israel Shahak, a vocal Israeli dis-

sender and a civil-rights advocate, wrote that the Israeli Ministry of Housing has "a special unit called 'department for the housing of minorities,' " which deals only with "non-Jews." Such a state of affairs is inevitable, since the laws of the Jewish National Fund stipulate that an Arab cannot lease Jewish land, a ruling that applies even to an apartment in government condominiums. The Ministry encourages Jewish housing inside Jerusalem, but discourages it for the minorities, in order to create new demographic facts. In Israeli parlance, according to Israel Shahak, "populating the Galilee" actually means "Judaization of Galilee." Far from inviting Arabs, presumably part of the Israeli population, to settle in Galilee, the Ministry of Housing tries "to thin them out."¹¹

With this exclusivist demographic concept in mind, Abraham Ofer, the former minister of housing who committed suicide after a financial scandal, called on the Israeli Army to remove some Bedouins who were settled in an area that, according to him, belonged "organically" to the "living space" of the new Jewish town of Yamit and to the settlers in the Rafiah Approaches. This was reported in *Al Hamishmar*, in its issue of August 22, 1975. The town was to be populated by over 25,000 Jews; therefore, the "non-Jews" (who, according to the Zionist myth, are non-existent or mere temporary inhabitants) had to be moved out.¹² *Haolam Hazeh* of July 12, 1973, had published the news of the mysterious and sudden killing of the chief of the evicted tribe. The killing was followed by several acts of intimidation. Rafiah's governor, Ofer Ben-David, invited four tribal chiefs to his office and "made them sign a blank authorization according to which they agree to sell their lands at any price offered them by the Government."¹³

The laws of Return and Nationality should also be seen in relation to the more specific and stringent laws governing the daily life of the Arabs in Israel. The Law of Administration Ordinance, the first Israeli legislative act, subjected all Arabs to various Emergency Regulations, which in point of fact abrogated all their civil rights and placed them under military government. The "legal" bases of the military government are a series of laws and "emergency regulations" promulgated by the British in the late 1930s to suppress Palestinian resistance to colonialism. They were later codified to quell those agitators among the ranks of the Zionists who were against the Mandate government.¹⁴ These laws, known as the Defense Laws (State of Emergency), 1945, consist of 170 articles. Another set of laws known as Emergency Laws (Security Areas), 1949, were issued by the Zionist state to tighten the control of the Israeli military government over the Arabs. The British Defense Laws of 1945 empowered the government to establish "defense areas" within which it could also designate "security zones." Authority within these areas and zones could be delegated to military officers of certain ranks.

The Israeli military authorities took full advantage of the provisions of the 1945 Defense Laws. The area where the majority of the Arabs lived was divided into military zones. No one outside or inside these security zones could enter or leave without a written permit from the military authorities. The permit, printed in Hebrew, usually included restrictions such as:

"The bearer is permitted to remain outside the closed area between 6 A.M. and 3 P.M. only"; "The bearer may not enter the (Jewish) colonies on route"; "The bearer may travel by such-and-such road only"; "This permit is invalid on Saturdays and on (Jewish) holidays"; "You may only leave the closed area for the purpose mentioned on this permit"; "You may not change your place of residence, as recorded in this permit, without permission from the Military Commander."¹⁵

The procedure of obtaining such a permit is not simple. Two weeks in advance of his proposed journey, the applicant must go to the nearest police station and submit an application, which is then forwarded to the military commander, who may or may not grant this permit. For instance, an Arab member of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights finds it much easier to get a permit to appear in court than to get a permit allowing him to travel to the area where an Israel civil rights group meeting is taking place.¹⁶ This means abrogation not only of his civil liberties, but also of his political rights.

New Outlook, a liberal Israeli monthly, gave us a glimpse of the impact of the permit system on the daily life of the Arabs. In a bus ride from Haifa to Nazareth, for instance, the bus would pull up and military police would go through the aisles checking the Arabs' travel permits, ignoring the Jews completely. Any Arab without the correctly signed and stamped slip of paper would be taken off the bus for questioning.¹⁷ One Arab who obtained a permit to go to the dentist eight times was seen "walking up and down the street," and consequently had his permit rescinded.¹⁸ Some Arab students are on ten-day permits, which means that they have to interrupt their studies and return home to have the permit renewed.¹⁹

The emergency regulations empower the military authorities in Arab-populated areas to expel or assign residence to any citizen, to enter and search any place, to seize and confiscate any goods and articles, and to bar individuals from making use of their private property or even from looking for a job. The regulations also entitle the military governor to impose a curfew to limit an individual's movement and to detain a citizen permanently without stating any charge more specific than that he constitutes a "danger to security." In the period 1956-1957, for example, 315

administrative orders were issued. These notorious laws were used to impose a Spartan curfew "on all the villages of the Triangle for most of the night for fourteen years."²⁰

It should be further noted that the one and "final authority regarding violations of emergency regulations was a military court, whose decisions were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts of Appeal."²¹ Almost all convictions in these courts were based on confessions that were obtained by torture, and denied by the accused in court.²²

Jacob Shapira, Israel's former minister of justice, asserted, following World War II when these regulations were applied by the British to the Zionist settlers, that "there was no such laws even in Nazi Germany." At the Conference of the Hebrew Lawyers' Union in 1946, one of the speakers characterized the emergency laws as a form of "official terrorism," and a resolution passed by the conference warned that these laws were "a serious danger to individual freedom," undermining "the foundation of law and justice." But as Emmanuel Dror, in a short study on the Emergency Regulations, noted: These regulations "were incorporated into the legal system of the newly born 'Home of the Jewish People,' supposedly the realization of the prophets' dream of justice and equality."²³

When the Eshkol government came into power in 1963, it gradually replaced the Military Administration by a civilian police apparatus that was to administer the laws. This process was completed by 1966.²⁴ However, the emergency regulations remained in full force, unchanged, as the Israeli historian, Aharon Cohen, pointed out in *Israel and the Arab World*.²⁵ Israel Shahak also explained that what had actually changed was not the military government *per se*, but rather the method of application—the old geographical basis had been replaced by an individual one. In the past, *all* Arabs within one geographical zone were detained; now they are theoretically free, but the "military commander can prohibit the movement of *any* Arab whatsoever," invoking the same Emergency Laws.²⁶

When these changes were introduced, "notice was sent to hundreds of people on the Military Commander's Black List." For those individuals, who constitute the leadership of the Arab community, the change meant a deterioration in their status. Before the "liberalization" of the laws, they, like the rest of the population, could move freely, at least in daylight hours, *within* the closed areas. After the change, they were forced to get a permit even for that. Moreover, whereas the punishment for leaving the closed area before the liberalization was usually a fine (up to 3,000 and 4,000 Israeli liras per day), after the passage of the new regulations, this was changed to imprisonment.²⁷

Finally, it should be pointed out that the Emergency Regulations were extended to the Arab territories occupied after 1967 and are being enforced there.²⁸

JEWISH LAND AND HEBREW LABOR

Since the main objective of the Zionist scheme was a land without a people, once the *eretz* had been emptied of its inhabitants and those who remained behind were subjugated, the land could be "legally" appropriated. By 1948, total Jewish holdings, leased and owned, still represented only "around 7 percent of the total land surface."²⁹ To enlarge that area, Israel enacted several laws, such as the Abandoned Areas Ordinance (1949), the Emergency Articles for the Exploitation of Uncultivated Lands (1947-1949), the Absentee Property Law (1950), and the Land Acquisition Law (1953). Under the first law, any area could be closed by the authorities for security reasons, and its Arab owners barred from it. It would then be declared "abandoned" or "uncultivated." Under the third law, it could subsequently be handed over to others, usually Jews, to cultivate. Many Arab citizens who had never moved from the part of Palestine that became Israel happened to be away from their lands and homes for a certain period during the process of Israeli occupation, annexation, and population transfer. They were barred from their villages upon their return, thereby becoming absentees, and their property was seized.³⁰ These Arabs earned the bizarre definition of "absent yet present," while the Palestinian refugees now *outside* Israel are completely "absent."³¹

The Land Acquisition Law consolidates Israel's stranglehold on Arab lands, for it "legalizes" and makes final the seizure of the land under the 1949 and 1950 laws, and empowers the transfer of the land thus seized to other owners.³²

The laws aiming at the expropriation of the land are not unrelated to the Emergency Laws. Quite often, the military governor would declare an area closed for military maneuvers and prohibit landowners from entering it for security reasons. Then the "abandoned" land would be confiscated. This, as Sabri Jiryis stated, quoting the words of an Israeli, means that the closed area "is being prepared for Jewish settlement, which is becoming more and more urgent, with the increasing waves of immigration."³³ Shimon Peres, as deputy minister of defense, stated in an article in *Davar*, on January 26, 1962, that "by making use of Article 125, on which the Military Government is to a great extent based . . . we can directly continue the struggle for Jewish settlement and Jewish immigration."³⁴

Since then, the process has continued unabated, with the result that about 150,000 hectares of Arab land have been expropriated by the Zionist state. Arab landholdings have therefore diminished considerably. The situation is further exacerbated by the high Arab birth rate. So, in Umm el Fahem, Israel's biggest Arab village, Arab landholdings originally totaled about 14,000 hectares of which only 1,200 remain, with an average of 700 births a year. "In the village of Ara and Arara, only 900 hectares remain

out of an original 5,000." This is a national phenomenon among Israeli Arabs, whose landholdings originally amounted to 1.5 hectares per family. By 1973, "the average had dropped to only 0.46 hectares per family, and the figure has declined even further since then."³⁵

The land appropriated before and after 1948 from the non-Jew was to be worked only by Jews, and the Zionist slogan or ideal of Hebrew labor was tailored to achieve that end. If the *eretz* cannot be redeemed except by the *halutzim*, then, as A. D. Gordon, the Zionist mystic "pacifist" demanded, "every single tree or plant in the Jewish Fatherland . . . [should] be planted only by [Jewish] pioneers."³⁶ To decode the religious and mystical myth into more political language, we have to turn to Ruppin, who declared at the Eleventh Zionist Congress (1913) that the Zionists wanted to found "a closed Jewish economy" in which "producers, consumers, and even middlemen shall all be Jewish."³⁷

The whole Zionist "cooperative" movement was basically the vehicle for the realization of the Zionist separatist vision. The cooperative approach, from the standpoint of practice, was primarily an economic and military tool that the settlers adopted in order to guarantee their own cultural and economic segregation, to check the hostility of the dispossessed native peasants, and to prepare for the peasants' eventual eviction at a propitious moment.

The Histadrut is a good case in point. This "trade union" of the settlers, set up to implement the program for economic segregation, organized demonstrations not so much against the exploitative classes, but against Jews who bought Arab produce or hired Arab labor. To realize their vision, many socialist Zionists had to exhort "Jewish housewives not to buy from Arabs." They felt it their duty to "picket citrus plantations so that no Arab worker could work there." They even poured "petroleum on Arab tomatoes," and went so far as to attack Jewish housewives and "break the 'Arab' eggs in their baskets," as David Hacoheh, a member of the Israeli Knesset, stated in *Haaretz* of November 15, 1968.³⁸ The zeal for pure Hebrew labor reached hysterical extremes at times. When some practical Zionists used cheaper Arab labor to plant the saplings of a bush named after Herzl, the purists demonstrated, uprooted the plants, and then, fired by ideological zeal, replanted them.

Hebrew labor has neither changed nor lost force through the passage of time or with the establishment of the state. In recent times, the "left-wing" Zionists of Moked staged "a demonstration . . . before the farm belonging to [the right-wing] general . . . Ariel Sharon, protesting the fact that he employs Arabs there."³⁹

The racism of the Zionist cooperative movement in agriculture is manifest in the theory and practice of the Jewish National Fund, which buys land only from non-Jews and now owns more than 90 percent of Israeli

farmland. This land is to be leased only to Jews, and only Jews may be employed to work on it. Article 3 of the constitution of the Jewish National Fund states that "land is to be held as the inalienable property of the Jewish people." "The Jewish Agency shall promote agricultural colonization based on Jewish labor, and in all works or undertakings carried out or furthered by the Jewish Agency it shall be a matter of principle that Jewish labor shall be employed." All Zionist agricultural settlements, including the "socialist" *kibbutzim*, exclude Arabs from their membership.

Israel has passed laws that implement the racial tenets, clauses, and ideology of the Jewish National Fund. The Agricultural Settlement Law, designed to stop the infiltration of the Arabs into the Jewish agricultural sector, prohibits even the subleasing of Jewish National Fund land to Arabs.

There have been official outcries against a few violations of these well-known and stringent restrictions. A report in the July 3, 1975, issue of *Maariv* referred to the launching of "a vehement campaign to eradicate the plague of land-leasing and orchard-leasing to Bedouins and Arab farmers in the Western Galilee."⁴⁰ The former Israeli Minister of Agriculture made use of the "plague" metaphor describing the domination of Jewish agriculture by Arab workers as "a cancer in our body."⁴¹ To hire Arab labor on Jewish settlements, either directly or through leasing land or renting the orchards, contradicts "the law and the regulations of the settlement authorities," according to Aharon Nahmani, director of the Galilee area for the Jewish Agency, in a note circulated to Zionist settlements.⁴²

Should some Israeli, out of moral commitment to a higher ideal or out of sheer economic necessity, hire an Arab, he is "punished" for his "unprincipled" act. The terms of the Jewish National Fund bluntly stipulate in Article 23 that failure to comply with this duty by employment of non-Jewish labor renders the lessee liable to the payment of compensation of a certain sum of money for each default. "The fact of the employment of non-Jewish labor shall constitute adequate proof as to the damages and the amount thereof, and the right of the Fund to be paid the compensation referred to. . . . Where the lessee has contravened the provisions of this Article three times, the Fund may apply the right of restitution of the holding without paying any compensation whatever."⁴³

This is not mere posturing, for there are frequent Israeli newspaper reports about agricultural settlements that have been "caught" breaking the law and leasing land for cultivation to non-Jews. *Maariv* of October 26, 1971, told its readers that the Jewish Agency planned to confiscate the land of a settler in *moshav* Nitzarei-Or and that legal action was also taken against *moshav* Etorim for renting land to Arabs.⁴⁴ In its November 5, 1971, issue *Maariv* reported cases where the Zionist settlers committed the "criminal" act of renting "land to Arabs who used to dwell on it before"⁴⁵

1948. Some settlements, "caught" redhanded, were solemnly warned that "if a settlement is caught once again leasing land [to Arab gentiles], all form of state support will be interrupted. That settlement will not receive water allotments, will not obtain credit, and will not enjoy development loans."⁴⁶

In 1960 a relative change took place when the Histadrut began admitting Arabs to its membership after 40 years of Zionist immigration, colonization, and settlement. This step, which paralleled the abolition of military government, suggests a moderation on the part of the Israeli authorities vis-à-vis Arab labor. However, it should be pointed out that the full rigor in the implementation of repressive acts is necessary only in the first stage of settler colonialism. Once the settle-colonialist power structure has fulfilled its objectives, such as a demographic majority and expropriation of the land, it can somewhat relax the stringent regulations. Incurably frank, Jabotinsky was of the opinion that "only when a Jewish majority was achieved could parliamentary institutions be introduced so that . . . the Jewish point of view should always prevail."⁴⁷

Such slight easing of restrictions is not unknown in other settler-colonial states and, as a rule, takes effect only after the consolidation of the power structure. For example, the May 2, 1977, issue of *Time* quotes Prime Minister Vorster as saying that "discrimination will be eliminated in South Africa." The *Time* report, however, goes on to say that "he meant merely that the government intends to modify some of the abrasive signs of petty apartheid—like separate facilities (toilets, buses, etc.) for blacks and whites." Vorster even talked of his government's commitment to "creating changes and opportunities" for nonwhites. But all this easing of restrictions is placed clearly within the overall commitment to white supremacy. The prime minister, without much evasiveness, declared that his government "has no intention of trying to create a multi-racial society." Needless to say, this consolidation of power makes it possible to restore the initial repression in full force when and if any significant resistance is mounted.

BODY AND SOUL, PAST AND PRESENT

Appropriation of the land and discrimination against Arab labor are not the only forms of Zionist racism. There is enough evidence to prove that the Israeli-Zionist establishment resorts to terror tactics ranging from physical liquidation to torture and collective punishment in order to subdue the Arab population. The Kafr Kasseem massacre is a good case in point. In 1956 on October 29, 47 inhabitants of that Arab village within Israel were machine-gunned by border guards upon reaching the outskirts of their village, to which they were returning after a day's work in the fields.

The victims included seven children and nine women. They were unaware of a curfew that had been imposed during their absence at work.

An Amnesty International Report on Israeli Methods of Torture, dated April 1970, describes instances where "dogs are let loose on prisoners usually handcuffed with hands behind backs," of fingers placed in the door jamb and the door closed on them, of fingernails pulled out with pincers, of prisoners injected with a pepper solution, and matchsticks inserted in the penis, among other barbarities.⁴⁸

Muaid Uthman al Bahash, a high school student, was tortured in Israeli jails and barred from meeting with visitors for six months. By the time he was finally allowed to receive his first visitor, his left hand was completely paralyzed.⁴⁹ Abla Taha was placed in a cell with several prostitutes who stripped her naked in the presence of a policeman. After being beaten brutally, she was left naked for 11 days and was kicked by a policeman named Duwayk. Though pregnant and bleeding after the torture, she was nevertheless denied medical treatment.⁵⁰

One of the latest incidents is that of Omar Abdul-Ghany Salameh, accused of being a Palestinian guerrilla. In 1969 Salameh was arrested and put in prison for one and a half years, during which he was tortured. But when he was arrested again on October 3, 1976, the torture he had to undergo surpassed anything he had been subjected to earlier. The story of his arrest and torture, reported by David Southerland in the March 1, 1977, issue of *The Christian Science Monitor*, begins at the "Russian Compound" in East Jerusalem, after a few punches he received on the road. Once there, Salameh was questioned by a man named Uri. When he denied that he belonged to any resistance group, "he was forced to lie face down on the floor while three men beat him on the soles of his feet with sticks." The ordeal, which lasted for five months, "included electric shocks which threw him into convulsions and suspension from the ceiling by a system of chains and pulleys which rendered him unconscious." The torturers "clapped their hands against his ears until his hearing was impaired." He was also forced to "clean a floor full of dirt and glass with his tongue" then "forced to swallow the filth afterwards." When he protested to his Israeli-Zionist torturers and "begged them in the name of God to desist," they said "your God is under [our] feet." The torture was also extended to Salameh's nephew, and one of the torturers threatened him that he might do "whatever he wanted with his wife."

Dr. Ahmad Hamza, chief surgeon and director of the King Hussein Hospital, indicated that Salameh had "difficulty walking and was suffering from fractured ribs, multiple 'contusions,' or bruises, and a general weakness due to a loss of weight." In the June 19, 1977, issue of the *Sunday Times* (London), the Insight Team of that paper, after a five-month inquiry, gave a detailed and thoroughly researched report about the nature

and extent of torture in Israel. The report indicated that torture in Israel is not mere "primitive brutality" that can be dismissed as the work of a "handful of 'rogue cops' exceeding orders," it is rather a "methodically organized" torture through "refined techniques" such as electric shocks, "confinement in specially constructed cells," and sexual assaults. All Israel's intelligence services were implicated—ranging from the Shin Beth, which reports to the Office of the Police Minister, to Latam (Department of Special Missions), which reports to the Prime Minister, to the Military Intelligence, which reports to the Minister of Defense. The report mentioned six torture centers in Israel: the prisons of the main occupied towns (Nablus, Ramallah, and Gaza), the Russian Compound in Jerusalem, and two other centers whose "whereabouts are uncertain" (one was said to be inside the military base at Sarafand near the Lod Airport, the other was said to be somewhere in Gaza).

Given the methodical nature of Israeli torture, it seems that every center specializes in one technique. At the Russian Compound, for instance, "interrogators tended to favour assaults on the genitals," whereas the torture center at Sarafand has a marked predilection to blindfold prisoners, hang them by the wrists and assault them with dogs. The Ramallah center apparently specializes in the electric shock technique. The report indicated that the objective of Israeli torture is to obtain information from the Palestinian prisoners and to "pacify" the occupied territories.

Among the more intimidating means of controlling the Arab population is collective punishment. Even though outlawed by the 1949 Geneva Convention, it has been widely used by the Israeli authorities in the occupied territories. Such punishment at times takes ingenious forms, and at other times follows more conventional lines. For instance, after a non-violent strike in Ramallah and al-Bira, all permits for importing sheep from the East Bank were canceled, and funds raised by the Association of Ramallah Immigrants in the United States were intercepted and denied to the Ramallah municipality.⁵¹ In 1976, after a mass demonstration in the same unfortunate town, its entire population (20,000) "was shut down for eleven days," except for short periods, ranging from one to three hours, as indicated in the May 30, 1977, issue of *Time* magazine.

A more conventional form of collective punishment is the concentration camp. Such camps were set up for the families (women, children, and others) of suspected Palestinian guerrillas who could not be apprehended. Since the term "family" in the extended Arab sense does not simply include parents and children, some of the interned families numbered as many as 200 persons. They are released only when the suspected person has been either caught or killed. On March 1971, the Israeli government openly admitted the existence of Abu-Zuneima, a desert camp in which 30 families had been interned.⁵²

Moshe Dayan advanced a new idea for punishment, combining conventional and unconventional techniques of concentration camps and collective punishment. Rather than single out individual families, he suggested that any town on the West Bank that shows signs of resistance should be "placed under blanket interdiction." This procedure was designed to deal a crippling blow to Arab livelihood by heading off food supplies, or "barring sheep from leaving for pasture." It is believed that there is a government plan now under preparation whereby an embargo on electricity, food, and medicine would be imposed on rebellious towns or villages, as reported in the May 31, 1976, issue of *Time* magazine.

Racial discrimination in Israel, far from being confined to the economic sector of society or to conventional forms and methods, reaches out to embrace almost all aspects of "life." Shalomit Alloni, a Knesset member concerned with civil rights, is critical of the fact that even the Israeli Ministry of Health, like that of Housing, is divided into the general office of health, serving Jews only, and the minority health subdepartment serving non-Jews.⁵³ Israel Shahak observed sarcastically, in describing this anomaly, that "only a separate health of a body of a Jew, and another sort of health of a body of a non-Jew are allowed to exist."⁵⁴ To preserve the all-too-important pure Jewish health, immunization of Jews takes priority over that of the minority.⁵⁵ The trustee of a Bedouin tribe in Galilee, who had even served in the Israeli Army, complained recently that his tribe was not granted "the right to receive immunization from the Ministry of Health."⁵⁶

Israel's racist campaign is not directed exclusively against the physical existence of the Palestinians; it extends to their very intellectual and cultural life as well. In his book *The Unholy War*, David Waines recalls that the "Mandate administration proposed the establishment of a British University in the city of Jerusalem to serve as the educational apex of the two public systems [Arab and Jewish]." The Zionists rejected the plan because it "constituted a threat to Hebrew culture in Palestine." The only university to be set up had to be a Hebrew university. Actually, the Zionists "refused to have anything to do with any education program where Hebrew was not the *sole* language of instruction."⁵⁷

On November 27, 1970, an editorial in *Haaretz* stated that among 16,000 college and university students in Israel, there were about 200 Arabs, and two of these were under administrative arrest.⁵⁸ Uri Lubrani, a former advisor on Arab affairs to the Prime Minister, in a statement made to *Haaretz* on April 4, 1961, gave expression to a Zionist hope frustrated by reality when he said, "If there were no [Arab] pupils the situation would be better and more stable. If the Arabs remained hewers of wood, it might be easier for us to control them."⁵⁹ There have been a number of Israeli newspaper articles about the threat and danger repre-

sented by the increasing number of Palestinian university graduates both in Israel and in exile.

Frustrated political Zionist hopes uniformly translate themselves into racist attempts to suppress the emergence of an educated Arab leadership. The Israeli establishment has denied freedom of movement and expression to a large number of Arab poets, playwrights, lawyers, and newspaper editors.⁶⁰ The establishment has also deported a number of leading intellectuals. One of the more recent deportees is Dr. Hanna Nasr, President of Bir Zeit College, where the faculty and students have been the object of persistent Israeli harassment. Aharon David, an advocate of quick and simple procedures leading to the attainment of the racist dream, has proposed that the Arab intellectual class be annihilated.⁶¹

The attempt to liquidate the Palestinians physically and intellectually assumes a curious aspect when it extends to traces they may have left behind in their exodus. As early as 1940, for instance, Weitz had reached the conclusion that "not one village, not one tribe should be left behind."⁶² Thereby it was hoped that the illusion of an empty *eretz* could be perpetuated, even though Palestine was described by Zionist thinker Ahad Ha'am in 1891 as a country in which it was very difficult to find arable land that was not already cultivated.⁶³ The Zionist program is being more or less meticulously executed by the Zionist state. Israel has bulldozed whole Arab villages, including their cemeteries and tombstones. Of 475 Arab villages in pre-1948 Palestine, 385 have been destroyed.⁶⁴ Israel's armed forces bulldozed more than 10,000 homes of resisting Arab civilians in Gaza and the West Bank in the period from July 1967 to December 1972.

There have been ruthless attempts also to obliterate traces of the past. History books are rewritten to accord with the Zionist vision. The Arabs, the indigenous inhabitants of the land for over 13 centuries, are referred to in an Israeli textbook as invaders who "conquered our country one thousand and three hundred years ago." Even though they settled in the land, "they did nothing to preserve it from the teeth of destruction."⁶⁵ It is further claimed that the Arabs of Palestine were in Palestine for hundreds of years, for "they arrived," we are told, "only some tens of years before the arrival of the Zionists." "They arrived in the 1830's and 1840's as refugees from the oppression of Muhammed Ali in Egypt," according to the directives approved by the Minister of Education and Culture.⁶⁶ A deliberately distorted vision of history has popularized the idea that the mass of the Palestinians came only *after* the Zionist settlement in search of jobs and to share in the new general prosperity and universal happiness created by Zionist settlement.

Segregating Jews from non-Jews in Israel is a procedure that is followed even in compiling statistics pertaining to infants. We are told

that infant mortality among Jewish children is meticulously recorded, but no such records have been kept for non-Jewish children. "Only from 1955 on . . . so far as is known under United Nations pressure, were the non-Jewish babies counted—separately."⁶⁷ The Zionist mind can even become obsessed with the thought that the unborn may be of the unwanted variety. Golda Meir, a grandmother herself, complained that she could not "sleep at night, thinking how many Arab babies are being born that same night," as reported in the Israeli press on October 25, 1972.⁶⁸

Discrimination in Israel sometimes takes subtle and devious forms. Ben Gurion believed that financial aid should not be given to all Israeli families indiscriminately, but he also was of the mind that the Israeli government could not *openly* practice discrimination. As a way out, he felt financial aid could be extended to large Jewish, but not Arab, families if the responsibility for distributing the aid was turned over to the Jewish Agency, a nongovernmental worldwide Zionist institution. He believed that the Agency and "not the government, should take care of encouraging a rise in the [Jewish] birth rate."⁶⁹

The notorious "Koeing Memorandum," written sometime in 1976, demonstrates that this line of thinking still prevails in Israel. Like Ben Gurion, Israel Koeing, the northern district Commissioner of the Interior, argued in a secret memorandum to the Prime Minister that the government should stop the payment of "big family" grants to the Arabs by transferring "this responsibility from the national insurance system to the Jewish Agency or to the Zionist organization, so that the grant is paid to Jews only."⁷⁰

A similarly subtle approach prompted the promulgation in Israel of the Discharged Soldiers Law (Reinstatement in Employment, Amend. No. 4). To avoid granting cash subsidies to Arab families with numerous children, the law confines such subsidies to soldiers or members of their families only. This guarantees that aid goes only to Jewish children, since Arabs cannot serve in the Israeli Army. It is hoped that in this way the Arabs will be discouraged from having too many children.⁷¹

Israeli-Zionist racism can at times go to astonishing extremes. As reported in *Yediot Aharonot* of August 5, 1975, the Eighteenth Congress for Talmudic Studies, held in Jerusalem and presided over by former Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin and the former Minister for Religious Affairs, Yitzhak Raphael, decided in one of its recommendations "that a Jewish doctor should not help a non-Jewish woman to conceive."⁷²

Probably nothing sums up the Israeli-Zionist attitude toward life and the craving for an unattainable purity better than the words of Israel Shahak: "*Everything* in Israel," the Israeli dissenter says, "is either Jewish or non-Jewish by official standards. A city, land, produce—even vegetables can be 'Jewish.' The very tomatoes and potatoes are tallied offi-

cially as 'Jewish' and 'non-Jewish.' ”⁷³

CHRISTIANS AND DRUZES

Zionist settlement from the outset has entailed the displacement and dispossession of the Arabs, whether Muslim, Druze, or Christian. The population of the two villages of Ikrit and Kafr Biram were Arab Christians. However, like other Arab villagers elsewhere in Palestine, they were displaced in 1948 in the customary Zionist fashion. The villagers appealed the evacuation orders in the Israeli Supreme Court, which issued a decree in 1951 upholding their right to return to their land. However, the government refused to honor the verdict, claiming that Kafr Biram was a “security area,” a decision which the court rejected. Be that as it may, Kafr Biram was declared a “closed territory,” and on September 16, 1953, the day of the Christian Feast of the Cross, the village buildings were blown up. Ikrit suffered the same fate; its turn came on Christmas Day of the same year.

After a few attempts to resettle the villagers elsewhere, the issue surfaced again. None other than Moshe Dayan declared that in the case of Ikrit and Kafr Biram, the necessity for keeping the two villages as “closed areas” no longer existed. His stand created an embarrassing situation for *Hashomer Hatzair*, the leftist Israeli group, which had set up a kibbutz in the area of the former Arab villages.

The case of the two villages raised issues concerning the legitimacy of Zionist dispossession of Palestinian Arabs, bringing into serious question the fate of other Arab villages that had been taken over. This fact in itself was cited as a convincing argument for the obduracy of the government. If Israel had relented in this particular case, the argument went, the action would have set a precedent for other Arabs to reclaim their lands and property. Writing in the July 14, 1972, issue of *Yediot Aharonot*, Yoram Ben Porath suggested that it was time to reeducate the Israeli masses in the basic tenets of Zionism, the first of these being “the fact that there is no Zionism, settlement, or Jewish state without the eviction of the Arabs and expropriation of their land.”⁷⁴

Although Zionism had dispossessed and disenfranchised Arab Muslims, Christians, and Druzes, it is claimed that the latter enjoy some minor privileges in Israel. Zionist propaganda sometimes argues in favor of a future Druze state acting as a buffer zone between Israel and Syria, this being part of the Zionist vision of a balkanized Middle East. But this vision founders on the Zionist structure of oppression, and the Druze finds himself in the same camp with his oppressed fellow Arab Muslims and Christians.

Even though he serves in the army, the Israeli Druze is a gentile, a fact that automatically bars him from certain rights and privileges granted

only to the Jews and subjects him to most of the disabilities inflicted on the non-Jews. He faces discrimination in his everyday life in housing, business, and in various other social and institutional contexts. *Al Hamishmar*, the Israeli daily, has reported complaints by Druze Arabs concerning the expropriation of their lands and the nonindustrialization of their villages.

Additionally, such legislation as the Law of Return and other varieties of Zionist laws apply to the Druzes as much as to other Arabs. Some Druze youths have requested that the Israelis be taught in schools that the term "Israeli" means not only Jewish but Druze too,"⁷⁵ a structural impossibility in the Zionist state.

As far as a Druze state is concerned, one must remember that all Israeli statements are extremely evasive. Such a state would have to be carved out of the organic *Eretz Yisrael*. It came as no great surprise to the Arab world when Israel discovered that Druze Arabs supported Palestinian resistance, or when Sheikh Farhud, a leading Druze tribal chief, asked that the law for compulsory recruitment of Druze youth in the Israeli Army be rescinded. He appealed for recognition of the Druzes as a part of the Arab people. In the 1976 uprisings among the Arabs of Israel in the Galilee and elsewhere in protest of land expropriation and discrimination, many Druze villages participated. The leading Arab poet inside Israel today, Samih al Qassem, is a Druze, a fact that the Zionists would do well to ponder.

A non-Jew in Israeli-Zionist vocabulary, as in the Balfour Declaration, means anyone in Palestine who is *not* Jewish, irrespective of whether he is Christian, Muslim, or Druze.

A FORM OF RACISM AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Despite the fact that Zionist theory and Israeli-Zionist practices are obviously discriminatory, some people still believe that the use of the term "racism" in reference to Zionism is unjustified for a variety of reasons. It has been said, for instance, that victims of racism cannot, by the very nature of things, be racists themselves, an argument not borne out by historical realities. While maintaining compassion for the victims of racism, one should not overlook the fact that to undergo such an ordeal is not necessarily the most purifying or ennobling experience. Racism does not itself teach man love for his fellow men. On the contrary, the victim at times may well be unaware that he himself is developing a form of reverse racism as a defense mechanism.

It is quite possible that the same harsh experience can ennoble one man, but brutalize another, depending on the complex psychological and historical circumstances of each individual. For instance, Menahem Begin, of Deir Yassin fame, and Golda Meir, a woman haunted by the fear of the natural increase of the Arab population, were by their own

admission subjected to humiliating racist slurs in their land of origin. Naturally, they have been traumatized by their experience. On the other hand, Israel Shahak, who survived the agonizing Holocaust experience as an inmate of a concentration camp, has been a vocal and fearless advocate of equal civil and political rights for Palestinian Arabs. He is an outspoken critic of Israel's discriminatory laws.

The preceding argument against the use of the term "racist" to describe the actions of victims of racism is but one argument among many that Zionist apologists resort to. Another, which may be called the semantic argument, is far subtler and has wider appeal. When used to describe Zionism, the term "racism" is a misnomer, we are told. "Racism," so goes the counterargument, is a discrimination on the basis of *race*, and since the Jews do not consider themselves a race, then they cannot be racists. For one thing, such logic presupposes eternal immunity of one human group against the charge of racism, regardless of any crimes committed by its members. Furthermore, and more important, the semantic argument is premised on the idea that there is a single definition for the terms "racism" and "race," which is not the case by any means. "Racism" is a complex term. Like other terms used to describe concepts, such as "nationalism" and "romanticism," the term "racism" is elusive and difficult to define. Such terms do not designate something physical or quantifiable; they are conceptual constructs that isolate certain aspects of human behavior in order to analyze and understand them. The elusiveness is further compounded by the fact that the traits we try to isolate are embedded in an infinite number of contexts and specific situations. Thus, each of these traits assumes a particular form that differs from one situation to another. It is restating the self-evident to say that no one expects to find the conceptual constructs "racism" or "romanticism" fully applicable in reality. Above all, the term "racism" is vague because it derives from a relatively undefined concept in anthropology, namely that of "race." There is no universally accepted definition of race. Categories such as the "ethnic" (with its cultural overtones) overlap with racial (genetic). There are definitions of race as simply a matter of genetics, and others into which the idea of genes does not enter at all. Webster's *New International Dictionary of the English Language* defines race in the strict genetic sense, yet also cites this broader one: "a state of being one of a special people or ethnical stock."⁷⁶ (Such a definition, incidentally, applies to the Jews as the Zionists see them.)

The writer of the entry on "Interracial Relations" in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* devoted a whole section to "The Problem of Definition." Starting off with the assertion that "the very term race is difficult to define," he suggested that we do away completely with the term and replace it

with the term "ethnic group," which may be characterized as having a "particular inherited physical type, or culture, or nationality, or any combination of these."⁷⁷

The author of the entry on "Racism" in the *New Encyclopedia Britannica* did not accept this suggestion. He drew a distinction between an "ethnic group" and a "racial group," in the belief that members of the latter have physical characteristics in common, whereas members of the former share "a common language, a common set of religious beliefs or some other cultural characteristics *without* physical considerations." He added, however, that his distinction is merely theoretical. In practice, the writer went on to explain, the distinction between "race" and "ethnic group" is not always clear-cut, and many groups are socially defined in terms of both physical and cultural criteria. He referred to the Jews as a clear example.⁷⁸

The leading theoreticians and originators of modern Western racism, such as Gobineau and Chamberlain, experienced difficulties with the term "race." Gobineau, for instance, writing in the mid-nineteenth century, admitted that "pure races" could no longer be found. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Chamberlain, who regarded the Jews "as alien in spirit to the favoured Teutons," admitted nevertheless the difficulty of "distinguishing Jews from Germans on the basis of physical characteristics alone."⁷⁹ The Italian fascist minister and theoretician Giacomo Acerbo felt the need to use the racialist term "Aryan" in order to isolate the Jewish minority from the "national organism." Nevertheless, he referred to the looseness of the very term he used.⁸⁰

But if terms used in the social sciences are elusive, the term "racism," as it is usually used, presents additional difficulties. Terms that are largely descriptive and only faintly evaluative, such as "romantic," are used to express an idea which in turn corresponds to an element in reality (an outlook, a mode of behavior, a painting). The term is used as a principle of classification. The scholar who uses it is quite often largely engaged in an endeavor that has no direct bearing on his economic or political interests, and which does not involve him morally in an intense way. Given the descriptive nature of the term, the person so described is not likely to be put on the defensive.

"Racism," on the other hand, is at once a descriptive and evaluative term. It defines an attitude derived not from the findings of scientific research about race but from mythic assumptions largely divorced from reality. Self-defense on the part of a group described as racist is understandable. Not many people would recoil when described as "romantic," but the most notorious racist or anti-Semite, especially in our enlightened days, would resist the definition.

The term "racist" not only refers to the *social structure* imposed

through oppressive discrimination, but also to the very *racial apologetics and myths* propounded by the oppressor in self-defense. These apologetics can change according to the racists' needs. If ethnology is respectable and if the "science" of the study of races is universally accepted, as was the case in Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, then the racist group develops a racial typology, attaches a value judgment to it, and uses it to buttress an exploitative *status quo*. When such theories are discredited, then the racist group conveniently changes its tune, without a corresponding change in the oppressive reality.

Examples of such switches are common. Apartheid in South Africa in the heyday of racialist thought in Europe was defended on racial grounds. At the present time, such attitudes are frowned upon by the world community. Therefore, the oppressors and beneficiaries of the *status quo* present their arguments in terms of ethnicity and culture. The *South African Observer*, a publication that stands to the "right" of the present South African regime, described itself in its December 1975 issue as "the only established publication that is trying to save a place in the world for the children and grandchildren of the generation now in power in South Africa."⁸¹ This smacks very much of the rhetoric of national liberation movements and has no vestige of the rhetoric of the superior white man and his celebrated burden. The magazine further described South Africa as the Western nation that is undeniably committed to the survival of the West.

Even Nazi Germany diversified its rationalizations. On the wall of some labor camps were inscribed such "ennobling" slogans as "Work will make you free," and on the very gate of the Buchenwald concentration camp was inscribed the motto, "My country, right or wrong,"⁸² an obvious attempt to justify extermination on patriotic and national grounds rather than on *openly* racial ones. What has changed in all of these instances is the rationalizing myth, or the ideological claims, not the structure of reality.

The rationalizing myths, like intentions, are a closed system which, if judged in isolation from the concrete structure that gave rise to it, will look undoubtedly noble. There is nothing inherently wrong about keeping a piece of land in the world for children of the Afrikaners, let alone preserving Western civilization. It is when placed in concrete reality that we begin to see the human cost of implementing the myth.

To accept the changing rationalizations as the only frame of reference is to surrender to verbal manipulation by the oppressor. Nazism would then cease to be a form of racism and racial discrimination; it would simply be national socialism. Apartheid would be simply apartheid or probably Christian nationalism. One scholar has solemnly suggested that discrimination in South Africa is based not on *race* but rather

on color, and consequently it should not be called *racism* but rather "pigmentocracy."

If we were to accept such reasoning, Fascist discriminatory action against the Jews would cease to be defined as such. After the Manifesto of Fascist Racism was issued on July 15, 1938, a Fascist periodical "stressed the 'spiritual' rather than the biological idea of race." However, "a month later . . . it went along with denying Jews influence in government or education because they had a different spirit," not genes.⁸³ Fascist discriminatory practices, then, on the basis of the semantic argument, should not be termed "racist." If we reduce the oppressive nature of the structures that racism erects to the very language of those structures, we end up with unrelated fragments of reality. Racism, then, despite all the discrimination and oppression, will simply disappear.

There is really no reason why the victims of racism should accept the distorted logic and verbal acrobatics of their oppressors. The black in the Bantustans knows that he does not have to be there for Western civilization to prosper. The European Jews and the workers in the slave labor camps saw no possible link between inscribed motto and the dismal truth. If it is in the interest of the oppressor to obfuscate reality, it is in the interest of the victim to study the concrete structure of discrimination outside the sphere of the oppressor's logic and rationalizations.

Where Zionism is concerned, the same tendencies can be detected. Ashley Montagu, in the *Bulletin of the American Professors for Peace in the Middle East*, presented a good example of the tendency to confuse defensive arguments with concrete practice. Denouncing the United Nations Zionism-racism resolution, Montagu argued that "racism is the practice of the *view* that members of certain socially defined groups are *biologically* characterized by certain traits which disable them from taking full advantage of political and social equality."⁸⁴ In Montagu's view, one of the determining factors in the classifying process seems to be the genetic *view* of race entertained by the oppressor. Therefore, the Israeli refusal to accept the return of the Palestinians to their homeland in 1948 is non-racist, for the Israeli practice was decided on "purely political grounds . . . racial [genetic] considerations were not in the least involved here. Political reality was." It would have been "suicidal" for the Israelis, Montagu asserted, "to have become a minority living among a majority in their own state."⁸⁵ The argument here distinguishes between injustice and exclusion rationalized on "racial" grounds and the same injustice and exclusion rationalized on "political" grounds. The former is morally reprehensible and the latter is somehow more acceptable in a world of *realpolitik*.

Montagu's choice of example was not exactly a happy one, for the "political" decisions of the Israelis are based on a demographic imperative

which is patently racist. Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben Gurion's biographer, a more knowledgeable man about Zionism than Montagu, admitted that the Zionist demographic imperative of a Jewish majority was among the basic principles of Zionism and that the principle could be called "racialist."⁸⁶

There are two basic weaknesses of the term "racism," as outlined above. The first is its ambiguity, given the ambiguity of the term "race" itself. The second is that the term "racism" defines an objective phenomenon, as well as its rationalizing myth of racial superiority. These weaknesses are not by any means unique to the term. When we run into such difficulties, we realize the limits of human discourse, and therefore a radical break with the term is extremely difficult or even impossible. Despite the nuances that distinguish one phenomenon from another, we retain the term because of its utility in designating certain common traits that would otherwise go undetected or remain unrelated to each other.

Perhaps the most we can hope for under the circumstances is to further clarify the term by adding qualifiers. We can consider "racism" as a generic term, referring to the social phenomenon of exploitative discrimination practiced by one human group, which defines itself on the basis of a trait (other than sex and class), against another that lacks that trait. Actually, this seems to be the implicit definition of the term in concrete practice.

Various international resolutions concerning racial discrimination demonstrate an awareness of the problem of definition. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [resolution 2106 (xx)] Article I defines "racial discrimination" as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social, cultural, or any other field of public life."

This broad and comprehensive definition relegates apologetics based on "race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin" to a secondary status, emphasizing the concrete act of "distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference" and thus making it the point of reference and the basis of classification. The terms "racism" or "racial discrimination" are to be used to refer to such acts of discrimination even when no genetic apologetics is involved.

But there remains the problem of the rationalizing myth and apologetics, which cannot be overlooked and which can be effectively used as a principle of classification for the subsystems of racism. It is suggested that a qualifier be affixed to the term "racism" as a help to differentiate these subsystems, so that one can cite Nazi racism, South African racism,

Fascist racism, meaning "distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference" based on Nazi, South African, or other interpretations. Or one could cite "genetic racism," "ethnic racism," and probably "religious racism," meaning exploitative discrimination on the basis of a theory of genes, exploitative discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, and so on.

In his book *The Fascist Experience*, Professor Edward R. Tannenbaum was aware of the limits of the term "racism" and the verbal acrobatics of the racists. Using the terms "biological racism" and "ethnic racism," he referred to the attempt of "Fascist theorists" to graft "biological racism" onto "ethnic racism."⁸⁷ His efforts at sharpening the meaning of the terms are praiseworthy, and they proved adequate for the context in which they were used, but his definitions have never achieved universal acceptance. Terms must occasionally be redefined and adapted to ever-changing human situations.

Turning from the general subject of racism to the more particular topic of Zionist practice, we can apply the same procedure of separating the phenomenon of exploitative discrimination from the rationalizations. In this chapter, the particulars of Israeli-Zionist practice vis-à-vis the Arabs have been described without dealing with the issue of the applicability of the term "racism" to such practice. Eminent anti-Zionist Jews are quite explicit on this score. Among the more distinguished Jewish scholars is Rabbi Elmer Berger, who defined racism as "a form of government or a structure of society in which national rights and responsibilities are officially legislated upon the basis of creed, color or ethnic derivation." On the basis of this definition, Rabbi Berger concluded that the Zionist character of much of "basic" Israeli law qualifies for the term "racist."⁸⁸

While not using the term "racism," Noam Chomsky stated flatly in his *Peace in the Middle East?* that the Jewish state cannot be democratic, for it wants to be as Jewish as France is French. This, he pointed out, "is patently impossible." The reason lies in the inevitable institutional discrimination that it must necessarily practice: An immigrant in France becomes French, and any disability he might be subjected to is a matter of personal or social bigotry. The non-Jewish citizen of the Jewish state, on the other hand, does not necessarily become Jewish. The disabilities he suffers because he is non-Jewish are a "matter of principle, not a departure from some ideal norm toward which the society strives." These disabilities, therefore, cannot be remedied "through slow progress."⁸⁹ The Jewish citizen in the Zionist state, whether he is for or against racism, benefits from institutional *de jure* discrimination. Again, this is a matter of an institutional structure that has little to do with his moral principles. Even if a Jew in Israel protests against discrimination and injustice, he is treated (with or without his approval) in a manner different from that reserved for the non-Jewish protestor.

One must now turn to the problem of apologetics in order to modify the generic term "racism" by affixing to it the specific term "Zionist," or "Israeli-Zionist," meaning "distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference" as practiced in the Israeli-Zionist state against Arabs (that is, non-Jews) on the basis of Zionist apologetics and rationalizations. One can use the more general term "ethnic racism" when referring to Eban's or Herzog's speeches, for instance, and "religious racism" when referring to the ideology of Gush Emunim. The term "Zionist racism," however, is at once more comprehensive and more precise because political Zionism itself is an ideology that rationalizes the alleged exclusive rights and claims of the Jew on racial, ethnic, religious, religio-national, and at times socialist grounds.

It should be borne in mind, however, that the subject of the controversy in this section is not the fact of discrimination against the Arabs in Israel. The discussion centers on the appropriateness of using the term "racism" with reference to specific Israeli-Zionist discriminatory practices. As such, it is primarily a matter of semantics. Efforts toward coining more diversified and precise terminology for the description of varieties of racism, relating the specific form and practice to the general conceptual construct, should be encouraged. The controversy surrounding terminology, however, should not be allowed to cloud our perception of the concrete structure of oppression. Palestinian peasants, and indeed many of the peoples of Asia and Africa, did not rebel against a conceptual construct—they mounted their resistance against real oppression.

THE RESPONSE OF THE ORIENT

ETERNAL ARAB HOSTILITY?

The histories of South Africa, Angola, Algeria, and other settler-colonial enclaves have shown that such enclaves are uniformly met with the hostility and resistance of the natives. In the face of such resistance, the settlers in turn had to organize themselves in order to break down the opposition and maintain their supremacy. Zionist spokesmen, however, given to a pseudo-historical rationalization of political Zionism, claimed that Jewish settlers, far from being colonists, were a people returning to its ancestral homeland. In his book *A Nation Reborn*, Richard Crossman suggested that both the British government and Chaim Weizmann expected Jewish settlement to be achieved and the "Western, civilized" Jewish state to be founded, "without upsetting the less civilized 'natives,'" ¹ It is hard to imagine how such a feat was thought possible.

In 1967, Ben Gurion claimed that none of the "great thinkers" of Zionism ever believed that the Zionist dream could be achieved "only through military victory over the Arabs."² Had the "great thinkers" consulted the writings of Karl Kautsky, the German-Jewish thinker and social analyst, they would have learned that Kautsky had predicted in 1921 that "every attempt made by the advancing Jewry in that country [that is, Palestine] to displace the Arabs cannot fail to arouse the fighting spirit of the latter."³ Two years earlier, the American historian and journalist Herbert Adam Gibbons, who was intimate with the Middle East, had emphasized that Jewish immigration into and development of Palestine could be "assured only by the presence of a considerable army for an indefinite period."⁴

A writer in the July 1920 issue of the *Atlantic* predicted with remark-

NOTES

CHAPTER 1 (Pages 1-17)

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13. Cited in Meir Ben-Horin, *Max Nordau*, p. 199.
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17. See "After the War: Chapters of Meditation, Rule and Research," published by the Central Command Headquarters/Israeli Army Chaplaincy. Publication of the booklet and some of its contents were reported in the Israeli papers *Haolam Hazeh*, May 15, 1974, (cited in *Free Palestine*, September 1974 and in *Al Hamishmar*, March 28, 1975, reprinted in *Swasia*, June 6, 1974). The entire passage is cited in *Viewpoint*, July 1974, p. 30.
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24. Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, Vol. IV, p. 314.
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37. "Uganda Scheme," *Encyclopedia Judaica*, Vol XV.
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Note: Although this bibliography includes very few references to Arab sources, I am deeply indebted to the writings of many Arab authors, particularly Dr. Fayez Sayegh, the Palestinian author and Counselor of the Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the United Nations, and Mr. Ahmed Bahaa El-Din, the Egyptian author and editor-in-chief of the Kuwaiti monthly, *Al-Arabi*. As I indicated in the Preface, I have confined myself, as much as possible, to sources written in English, since this study is addressed to an English-speaking audience.

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